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Presentment and Payment in Cheque Electronic 
Clearing: Advance Bank v. TD Bank 
Benjamin Geva* 
In the context of Advance Banlc v. TD Bank, a case involving the return of across border 
dishonoured cheque by a Canadian drawee bank, the article addresses issues relating 
to the presentment and payment of cheques in Canada. It deals with compliance with 
the statutory requirements for presentment in the context of CPA clearing rules, and 
further discusses the legal implications of the treatment of a cheque processed in the 
clearing. The article argues that a delayed return of a cheque by the drawee bank 
constitutes "payment" of the cheque that benefits the depositor vis-a-vis the collecting 
bank, though not the drawee bank. 
Cet article traite de la presentation et du paiement des cheques au Canada, dans le 
contexte de l'a.ffaire Advance Bank v. TD Bank, une cause impliquant le refus de 
paiement d'un cheque tire sur une banque canadienne et son retour outre frontiere. II 
analyse Les di.fferentes exigences legislatives en matiere de presentation dans le contexte 
des reg/es de compensation de /'association canadienne des paiements, de meme que 
Les aspects juridiques du traitement d'un cheque soumis a la compensation. Suivant 
/'auteur, un retour de cheque e.ffectue tardivement par la banque tiree equivaudrait 
pour le depositaire au paiement du cheque et ce, vis-a-vis de la Banque chargee de 
l'encaissement, mais non vis-a-vis de la banque tiree. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Advance Bank v. Toronto Dominion Bank' ("Advance") a 
cheque cleared in the interbank electronic clearing system operated by 
the Canadian Payments Association (CPA) was returned dishonoured. 
Parties to the litigation were the bank on which the cheque was pur-
portedly drawn and the collecting bank, into which the cheque was 
originally deposited. The former was a CPA member. The latter was a 
• Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto. Research 
assistance provided by Michael Colwell of the 2005 class of Osgoode Hall Law 
School and funding from the Centre for Innocation Law and Policy-University of 
Toronto Faculty of Law are acknowledged with gratitude. 
1 (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 1927, 227 D.L.R. (4th) 755, 35 B.L.R. (3d) 266, 65 O.R. 
(3d) 46 (Ont. S.C.J.) (Speigel J.). 
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cross border institution and not a member of the CPA. It accessed the 
CPA interbank cheque clearing system by having its own correspondent 
bank, another cross border non-CPA member, using another correspon-
dent bank, a CPA member, acting as the presenting bank.2 
The Court found that the cheque was neither accepted nor paid so 
that it was validly returned dishonoured. It also held that a non-CPA 
member, to which the cheque was originally deposited, could not sue 
the drawee bank on the basis of any alleged breach of CPA Rules 
' governing cheque clearing in the CPA interbank clearing system. 
In holding against the bank of deposit, the judgment given did not 
break new ground. Rather, it applied a derivation from a principle pro-
nounced by earlier case law, which was well presented and rationalized 
by Bradley Crawford, in an article3 specifically relied on by the Court.4 
As will be explained further below, although there was some irony in 
the final result, neither the derivation itself nor the principle from which 
it was made was a novelty. Moreover, I would endorse its ultimate 
conclusion in favour of the drawee bank. Yet, together with some ob-
servations made by the Court, it is precisely the derivation cited by the 
Court in support of its holding, with which I take issue and that I wish 
to revisit. 
2 CPA was established in 1980 under the Canadian Payments Association Act, R.S.C. 
1985, c. C-21, subsequently renamed the Canadian Payments Act (S.C. 2001, c. 9, s. 
217). It operates the Canadian interbank cheque clearing system under a mandate to 
operate a national clearing and authority to issue by-laws and rules concerning clear-
ing arrangements, referred to below as "clearing rules." Non-bank financial institu-
tions may be eligible to become CPA members; yet, only deposit-taking institutions 
take part in the interbank cheque clearing, all of which are referred to throughout this 
article as "banks". Participants in the interbank cheque clearing system may be "direct 
clearers," who constitute a small group (around 12 out of total membership of close 
to 120), consisting of the large institutions that take part in the actual exchange of 
cheques in Regional Exchange Points throughout Canada and have settlement ac-
counts with the Bank of Canada. The rest of the participants are "indirect clearers", 
for which correspondent direct clearers act as clearing agents in the exchange and 
who settle in correspondent accounts maintained with respective direct clearer-clear-
ing agent. See B. Crawford, Payment, Clearing and Settlement in Canada, vol. I 
(Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2002) at 128-153. The CPA website is: <http:// 
www.cdnpay.ca>. 
3 B. Crawford, "Late Return of a Dishonoured Cheque" (2001) 36 C.B.L.J. I. 
4 Supra, n. l at 53. For earlier case law see also J. Goodman, "Cheque Clearing Cases 
Create Confusion" (2002) 17 B.F.L.R. 99. 
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Standing on its own the derivation may seem logical, but in a 
broader context it is not all that sensible. It does not reflect good law 
and does not fit well in the overall scheme of the law of cheques. Having 
undesirable side effects that ought to be avoided, the derivation is not 
inevitable; in fact there is case law to the contrary so that legislative 
intervention may not be necessary. 
Following the exposition of the facts and the judgment, the ensuing 
analysis will address three fundamental issues raised in the case in 
connection with the present electronic cheque clearing regime in Canada. 
An argument will be presented and substantiated on each of the three 
issues. First, in the course of the clearing process the drawee bank does 
not "accept" a cheque. Second, in the clearing process valid "present-
ment" is required and its occurrence is to be identified. Third, in delaying 
the return of a cheque, a drawee bank becomes liable to the presenting 
bank for its payment. In the context of the Canadian interbank cheque 
clearing system, between direct clearers, "payment" occurs by the loss 
of the right to revoke the provisional settlement, made earlier, at the 
time the cheque was delivered by the presenting bank to the drawee. 
Fourth, where the drawee bank paid to the presenting bank, the customer 
who deposited the cheque for collection is entitled to receive payment, 
though not from the drawee bank. Rather, the depositor's entitlement is 
from the depositary bank, at least as of the time the latter had received 
payment. 
In the final analysis, the principle under which a depositor may not 
sue for breach of interbank clearing rules to which the depositor is not 
privy is sound. Nonetheless, in my view, it does not follow that the 
depositor may not benefit from "payment" that occurred under them; it 
is this alleged derivation with which I~ ls 
In conclusion, I am in agreement with the Court on the first point 
(acceptance), but find the discussion on the second point (presentment) 
to be problematic, and do not concur with the analysis on the third point 
(payment). While the Court did not discuss the fourth point (conse-
quences of payment), I agree with the dismissal of the action against the 
drawee bank. 
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2. THEFACTS 
All facts were undisputed. On April 4, 2001 a cheque for 
CDN$285,000 ("the cheque") purportedly drawn on the Collingwood 
branch of the defendant, Toronto Dominion Bank ("TD"), was deposited 
in Illinois in an account with the plaintiff, Advance Bank ("Advance"). 
The cheque was forwarded for collection to TD in Toronto, through 
American National Bank of Chicago ("ANBC") and the Bank of Nova 
Scotia ("BNS"), both acting as intermediary banks; ANBC being a 
correspondent or clearing agent for Advance and BNS being the same 
for the ANBC. In the course of the collection process, both Advance's 
account with ANBC and ANBC's account with BNS were credited.5 
On April 9, 2001 the cheque reached the Toronto Data Centre of 
BNS. That day, BNS delivered the cheque for payment to TD Toronto 
Data Centre. Delivery was made through the Canadian cheque clearing 
system operated by the Canadian Payments Association under clearing 
rules issued by it ("the Rules").6 The TD Data Centre was operated by 
an independent service provider, Symcor Services Inc. ("Symcor"). It 
carried out automated processing of cheques drawn from TD branches, 
in a process culminating in an automatic date stamp being imprinted on 
the back of each cheque, upon which the customer's account was debited 
automatically. In the facts of the case, the purported drawer, a TD 
customer, was promptly advised by means of a daily electronic statement 
on April 9, 2001. Having noticed the pertinent debit item in the state-
ment, the customer immediately contacted the CoJJingwood branch, 
which in tum requested a copy of the cheque. That branch received the 
cheque a week later, on April 16, 2001, and forwarded it to the customer. 
5 Also in the course of the collection process, on April 5, 200 I, ANBC called the TD 
Collingwood branch and received oral confirmation as to the availability of funds 
and lack of an outstanding stop payment order with respect to the cheque. It then 
advised Advance as to the USD equivalent of the cheque, being $179,407.50. 
6 Throughout this article, "clearing rules" denote rules governing the interbank clearing, 
issued under any type of multilateral interbank agreement. As indicated supra, n. 2, 
in Canada "clearing rules" are now issued by the CPA, which, although established 
by statute, is an industry-based organization and hence its rules can be seen as issued 
on the basis of the agreement of participants. Outside Canada such rules may be 
called "clearing-house rules;" the emphasis in the latter term is on the interbank 
"clearing-house association" which issues them as well as on a physical facility, the 
clearing house, where interbank clearing takes place. Particularly the latter feature is 
not part of the interbank cheque system in Canada. 
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The latter promptly advised the branch that same April 16, by means of 
a declaration, that the cheque was forged. Around April 20, 2001, TD 
credited its customer account with the amount of the cheque.7 
Around 10 days later, on or about April 26, 2001, TD returned the 
original cheque8 directly to Advance. The cheque arrived by overnight 
courier at the Advance Illinois branch of deposit, presumably on that 
same date. After around three weeks, on May 15, 2001, TD returned a 
certified true copy of the cheque to Advance through the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago ("FRC") that debited Advance' s account with it ac-
cordingly. 
It is not clear why FRC debited Advance's account with it, when 
it was Advance' s account with ANBC that was credited with the amount 
of the cheque. Also, the report is silent on the settlement between the 
two Canadian banks, TD and BNS respectively, acting as the drawee 
and presenting banks in this case. Evidently, settlement between them 
took place on the books of the Bank of Canada with the amount of the 
cheque included in the respective interbank balances settled for April 9, 
2001.9 TD's balance must have included a credit for the cheque and 
BNS's balance must have included a corresponding debit for it. There 
is also no information as to whether and when the reverse occured in 
the process of the return of the cheque, not only between TD and BNS 
(on the books of the Bank of Canada), but also between BNS and ANBC 
(on the books of BNS), and obviously, it is unclear as to the reimburse-
ment of ANBC from Advance. 10 It can safely be assumed that all those 
7 Sees. 48(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-4, providing that a forged 
signature is "wholly inoperative and no right to retain the bill or to give discharge 
therefor or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto can be acquired 
through or under that signature". A cheque is specie of a bill. See s. 165. 
8 In the language of the Court, supra, n. l at 50, "TD obtained the original Cheque and 
returned it to Advance ... "; presumably, it obtained it from Symcor, ibid. 
9 The normal settlement procedure for the end of the day exchange in CPA, the 
interbank cheque clearing system, takes place on a multilateral basis on the books of 
the Bank of Canada on the next banking day; yet, it is backdated to the day of the 
exchange. In the facts of the case this would have meant April 10 settlement for April 
9 exchange, backdated to April 9. 
10 Perhaps when the cheque was forwarded for collection, Advance's account was 
credited and ANBC's account was debited on the books ofFRC, in which case, upon 
the return of the case, FRC debited the account of Advance (as the report actually 
tells us) and credited ANBC's account (which would have given ANBC its reim-
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reverse entries actually occurred; nothing however turns on their exact 
timing. 
Upon originally receiving the cheque for deposit on April 5, 2001, 
Advance advised its customer, the depositor, that the funds would be 
held for seven daysY On this basis, Advance released funds to its 
customer on April 11, 2001, before the forgery was discovered and the 
process of return commenced. TD advised Advance of the forgery and 
the return of the cheque either on April 17 or April 25, 2001, either way, 
after the funds had been released to the depositor. In the facts of the 
case, Advance was thus left to initially bear the loss as it released the 
funds for a cheque for which credit to its own account was reversed. 
In cheque clearing terminology, 12 Advance, ANBC, and BNS were 
collecting banks. Among them, Advance was a depositary or negotiating 
bank, ANBC and BNS were intermediary banks, and BNS was the 
presenting bank. TD was the drawee or payor bank. 
3. THE JUDGMENT 
Both banks agreed on the facts in the dispute but disagreed as to 
the conclusions of law to be drawn. Advance sued TD for recovery on 
the basis of unjust enrichment. 13 The Court formulated the question 
presented to it to be whether TD-accepted or paid the cheque so as to be 
liable on it. It then proceeded to dismiss the claim on three grounds. 
First, the Court held that not being a CPA member, Advance could not 
rely on the Rules to its benefit; presumably, this included any inference 
as to the occurrence of payment derived from the Rules. Second, the 
Court held that in the absence of a signature placed on the cheque there 
was no acceptance; specifically no acceptance took place by the affix-
bursement but of which the report does not provide any information). We can only 
speculate on this point since the judgment does not mention FRC in connection with 
the collection (as opposed to the return) of the cheque, and further, is telling us that 
in the course of the collection process it was Advance's account with ANBC and 
not FRC that was credited. 
11 Evidently, Advance purported to comply with Regulation CC Availability of Funds 
and Collection of Checks, 12 CFR Part 229. 
12 In the absence of statutory definitions in Canada, the ensuing terminology draws on 
common banking parlance and clearing rules as well as inspired by Article 4 of the 
American Uniform Code-Bank Deposits and Collections. 
13 Supra, n. I at 51. 
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ation of the date stamp at the Data Centre. Nor did the "automatic debit 
and credit, which are meant to be provisional under the Rules, ... create 
acceptance." Rather, "[t]here must be something more; the drawee must 
puts its mind to final payment."14 Third and finally, the Court held that 
the delivery of the cheque by BNS to the TD Data Centre was not a 
presentment for payment and did not trigger the actual payment of the 
cheque. 
In conclusion the Court held, "[t]here was no acceptance of the 
Cheque, nor was there payment on the Cheque either through the Clear-
ing or upon presentment. Absent acceptance or payment, TD is not liable 
on the Cheque. Since TD was only spared an expense that it was not 
required to incur, it cannot have been unjustly enriched."15 In the result, 
TD's motion for summary judgment to dismiss was granted and Ad-
vance's motion for summary judgment to allow recovery was denied. 
Judgment was thus given in favour of TD. 
4. DISCUSSION 
The Court's own analysis was divided into three parts. First, the 
Court discussed the relevance of the clearing rules for the resolution of 
the dispute. Second, it dealt with the existence or absence of acceptance 
in the facts of the case. Third, the Court analyzed the occurrence of 
presentment of payment, following which payment may have occurred. 
It seems to me that separation among the various issues under the anal-
ysis of the Court in each of its headings is far from being clear. It is thus 
preferable to discuss the judgment and its underlying issues under dif-
ferent headings, being acceptance, presentment for payment, payment, 
and Advance's rights and remedies. An overall framework will be pre-
sented following the discussion. 
(a) Was the Cheque Accepted? 
It is not usual for a cheque to be accepted; it may nevertheless be 
certified; it was held that "the certification of a cheque by a bank is 
14 Supra, n. I at SS. The Court further held that in the facts of the case Symcor, the 
independent service provider that operated the TD Data Centre (above, paragraph 
containing notes 6-7), lacked the authority to accept cheques on behalf of TD. 
15 Supra, n. I at S7. 
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equivalent to acceptance." 16 Under the Bills of Exchange Act (BEA) 17 
acceptance requires the drawee's signature. 
In discussing the existence of signature in Advance, the Court did 
not deny the possibility that a stamp on the back of a cheque could be 
an adequate signature, 18 but concluded that the automatic affixation of 
a date stamp, "can hardly be said to be acceptance." 19 On this point the 
Court was correct. 
Regrettably however, the Court's discussion on acceptance20 was 
interwoven with its discussion on payment. Relying on National Slag v. 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce,21 the Court concluded that "[t]he 
automatic debit and credit, which are meant to be provisional under the 
Rules, also do not create acceptance. There must be something more; 
the drawee must put its mind to final payment."22 Along these lines, the 
Court concluded, "the requirements for acceptance under the BEA were 
not met in this case. The automatic date stamp place by Symcor on the 
cheque did not constitute acceptance, nor did the automatic debits and 
credits to [the purported drawer-TD customer]'s and BNS' accounts."23 
16 Maubach v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1988), 1987 Carswell Ont 1072, 62 O.R. (2d) 220, 
44 D.L.R. (4th) 575, 25 O.A.C. 211 (Ont. C.A.), affd (l 987), 1987 CarswellOnt 
866, 60 O.R. (2d) 189, 40 D.L.R. (4th) 134 (Ont. H.C.). In Advance, supra, n. lat 
53, the Court recognized the functional equivalence between the certification of a 
cheque and the acceptance of a bill of exchange, though it reversed the logical 
sequence; rather than stating that the certification, being the uncodified practice, is 
the equivalent to acceptanq:, which is codified, it stated that "[a]cceptance is similar 
to certification, by which a bank irrevocably lends its own credit to the instrument". 
"Certification" would have required the withdrawal of the amount of the cheque 
from the purported drawer's account into a special suspense account, which did not 
happen in Advance. 
17 Supra, n. 7. Relevant provisions are ss. 35 and 130. To be "complete and irrevocable" 
acceptance must also satisfy notice requirements under BEA, s. 38, an aspect that 
was overlooked by the Court. 
18 For the application of this proposition to certification, see Bank of Nova Scotia v. 
Canada Trust Co. (1998), 1998 CarswelIOnt 1284, 39 O.R. (3d) 84, 41 B.L.R. (2d) 
!09 (Ont. Gen. Div.), specifically relied upon by the Court. 
19 Ibid., at 54. 
20 Ibid., at 53-56. 
21 (1982), 1982 CarsweIIOnt 1333, 140 D.L.R. (3d)473 (Ont. H.C.), aff'd (1985), 1985 
CarswellOnt 1734, [1985] O.J. No. 149, 19 D.L.R. (4th) 383 (Ont. C.A.). 
22 Supra, n. I at 55. "Rules" are CPA Rules. See text at n. 6, supra. 
23 Ibid., at 56. 
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Nevertheless, to determine acceptance it would have been adequate 
for the Court to address the signature aspect. Simply stated, on the basis 
of lack of intent to be bound, or any representation that may suggest the 
automatic date stamp was a signature, there was no acceptance. 
(b) Was the Cheque Presented for Payment? 
Under the BEA, a cheque must be presented within a reasonable 
time after its issue. 24 Presentment is to be made by the physical exhibition 
of the cheque,25 by the holder or on the holder's behalf, to the drawee 
bank,26 usually at its branch as indicated on the cheque, being "the 
address of the drawee ... given in the [cheque]."27 
Under BEA, s. 84, and unless excused,28 the presentment of a 
cheque is required in order to charge its drawer, as well as any endorser, 
with liability thereon. Its objectives are twofold. First, the presentment 
is aimed at achieving certainty as to the moment of demand of payment 
addressed to the drawee, so as to force the drawee to respond unequiv-
ocally, either by paying the cheque or dishonouring it. Second, the 
presentment purports to ensure that demand for payment be made by the 
holder or on the holder's behalf, that is, by the one to whom the cheque 
is payable and who is in possession of the cheque.29 Payment in due 
course that discharges the cheque must be made on or on behalf of the 
drawee and to the holder.30 This twofold objective eliminates ambiguity 
as to rights and duties arising in the collection and payment process. 
Presentment thus serves the interests of both the drawer and holder, as 
well as their banks. 
Per BEA, s. 129(a), adequate presentment is a term of the statutory 
engagement of the drawer vis-a-vis the holder. That is, it is only upon 
the dishonour of the cheque by the drawee, being the drawee's refusal 
24 BEA, s. 85(1)(b). Delay is excused where caused by circumstances beyond the 
control of the holder. See BEA, s. 90. 
25 BEA, s. 84(3). 
26 BEA, s. 86(1 ). 
27 Under BEA, s. 87(b) this is the proper place of presentment "where no place of 
payment is specified [in the cheque]." 
28 Presentment is dispensed with inter alia when there are no funds in the account, nor 
is there an overdraft facility available, and when it was waived. See BEA, s. 91. 
29 "Holder" is defined in BEA, s. 2. 
30 BEA, s. 138. 
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to pay upon presentment, made by the holder to the drawee, and the 
ensuing dishonour proceedings, that the drawer becomes liable ~o com-
pensate the holder. Furthermore, adequate presentment is a term in 
contract other than those arising from the cheque itself. Thus, it is a term 
in the contract between the holder and the bank of deposit. Absent 
presentment neither payment, nor dishonour that will give rise to the 
liability of the drawer, will occur. The bank of deposit is therefore under 
contractual liability to its customer, the deposit-holder, to ~ake the 
required presentment so as to lead either to the payment of the cheque, 
or to liability upon its dishonour. As well, adequate presentment is a 
term in the contract between the drawer and the drawee bank. The drawee 
bank's authority and duty owed to the drawer, its customer, to honour 
(i.e., to pay) a cheque, 31 is upon the presentment of the cheque. Finally, 
adequate presentment is a term in the interbank agreement between the 
bank of deposit and the drawee bank, whether bilateral or multilateral, 
and whether or not embodied in clearing rules. Each bank requires 
presentment to discharge its own obligations towards its own customer, 
the drawer in the case of the drawee bank, and the depositor-holder in 
the case of the bank of deposit. 
In the case at bar, Advance argued that presentment took place in 
the Clearing. According to Advance, "the cheque was presented when 
it was delivered through the Clearing to the TD and was paid when TD 
debited the funds from [its customer-purported drawer)'s account."32 
The Court rejected altogether this argument. Rather, it accepted TD's 
position "that when members of the CPA exchange cheques through the 
Clearing, the BEA prerequisites for presentment for payment are, in 
effect, mutually waived by members of the CPA for their benefit and 
detriment in the operation of the Clearing. "33 
This statement cannot be taken to mean that banks participating in 
the clearing process are free to effectively waive BEA statutory pre-
sentment requirements. As indicated, adequate presentment is required 
31 Obviously, the drawee bank's contractual duty to pay is not absolute, rather it is 
subject to the availability of funds either in the drawer-customer's account, or of an 
overdraft facility to him or her. See Barclays Bank v. W.J. Simms, I Lloyd's Rep. 
225, [1980] Q.B. 677 (Goff J.) at 238 [Lloyd's]. 
32 Supra, n. I at 56. 
33 Ibid., at 57. 
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under each banking contract, that is, the one between the bank of deposit 
and the depositor-holder, and the other between the drawee bank and 
the drawer-customer. The issue is not simply that of the prevalence of 
the BEA over internal CPA Rules, or for that matter, any interbank 
agreement, as the Court appears to assume. 34 Rather, the point is that by 
itself, an interbank agreement cannot adversely affect customers' rights, 
namely that of the drawer and the depositor-holder. Indeed, it is only up 
to the drawer, the party liable on the cheque, in his or her agreement 
with the payee, the original holder, to waive the presentment require-
ment. 35 To confer such power on collecting and paying banks is contrary 
to principle, and indeed as explained below, contrary to authority. 
Elsewhere I argued that the better policies support the banks' ability 
to nevertheless agree on an alternative procedure for presentment, as 
long as such procedure facilitates the two fold objectives of the statutory 
presentment mentioned above.36 However, to be effective and bind the 
customers, the procedure, originally set out in the interbank agreement, 
must be incorporated into their respective banking agreement so as to 
be implicit in their own, inter-customer or drawer-payee/holder contract. 
It is in this context that remote presentment, or cheque truncation, may 
be introduced even without a legislative amendment.37 
The Court's statement as to the ability of banks to waive present-
ment requirements might have been a mere unguarded observation, and 
in any event, was obiter. In the final analysis, the Court concluded that 
in the facts of the case "[t]he [TD] Data Centre was not the proper place 
for Advance to effect presentment, nor was Symcor authorized to pay 
or refuse payment on TD's behalf. TD did not waive the BEA require-
34 Ibid. In support to this proposition the Court cited Bank of Nova Scotia v. Toronto 
Dominion Bank, (2001), 2001Carswel!Ont1525, [2001] O.J. No. 1717, 145 O.A.C. 
106, 200 D.L.R. (4th) 549 (Ont. C.A.). 
35 Waiverof presentment may be express or implied. See BEA, s. 91 (I )(e ). Presentment 
(by the holder to the drawee) is a condition to the liability of the drawer. See BEA, 
s. l 29(a); it is therefore only for the drawer to waive it, and thereby to assume liability 
even in its absence. 
36 See paragraph containing n. 28-30, supra. 
37 B. Geva, "Off-Premises Presentment and Cheque Truncation under the Bills of 
Exchange Act" (1986-7) I B.F.L.R. 295. Point is summarized in B. Geva, Bank 
Collections and Payment Transactions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 
146-148. This is not to say that a legislative amendment introducing remote pre-
sentment is not welcome. 
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ments with respect to dealing with Advance and the prerequisites of 
presentment was not fulfilled."38 Regrettably, there is no finding in the 
judgment as to whether the cheque was presented, either at the Colling-
wood branch of TD on which it was drawn, or elsewhere, under an 
effective alternative procedure. On its part, the Court appears to suggest 
that had Advance made presentment "at the TD location that was au-
thorized to make decision . . . it could have avoided the dispute,"39 
thereby implying that in the facts of the case the presentment require-
ments were not fulfilled. In the view of the Court, a decision by Advance 
to effectively bypass a statutory presentment was "a necessary part of 
the risk assessment that banks ... must make on an ongoing basis."40 
This is however quite a startling position that must be taken with a 
grain of salt. In Barclays Bank pie v. Bank of England,41 Bingham J. 
dealt with "the duty of a banker entrusted with a cheque for collection 
... to obtain reasonable steps to obtain payment of the cheque .... "He 
specifically held such duty to be "subject to the overriding statutory rule 
that the appropriate way to obtain payment under a cheque is ... to 
present it for payment .... "42 He did not rule out the possibility of banks 
contracting out of the statutory requirement of presentment at the drawee 
branch,43 and agreeing on another place, as for example, the clearing 
house.44 Nonetheless, being the demand for payment, presentment must 
be made at the place where the banking decision as to whether to pay 
the cheque is to be made.45 Furthermore, an alternative arrangement 
under which presentment is to be made, other than as required by statute, 
38 Supra, n. 1 at 57. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 [1985] 1 All E.R. 385 (Bingham J.). 
42 Ibid., at 390. 
43 The statutory scheme in England is the source of the Canadian scheme and hence 
Bingham J.'s discussion is fully applicable in Canada. Relevant provisions in the 
English Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 (c. 61), to which Canadian ss. 85(l)(b), 84(3), 
86(1),87(b), 84 and 91, discussed supra, in text at n. 24-28 respectively correspond, 
are ss. 45(2), 52(4), 45(3), 45(4)(b), 45 (first paragraph) and 46(2). 
44 As indicated supra, n. 6, clearing in Canada does not involve a centralized facility 
such as the "clearing house." Yet, in applying Bingham J.'s analysis, the point of 
receipt of the cheques by the drawee bank, at one of the Regional Exchange Points 
across the country, could be viewed as the relevant point in Canada. For the CPA 
interbank cheque clearing system, see n. 2 supra. 
45 Supra, n. 41 at 393-94 and authorities there cited. 
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is effective only where the drawer "knows and expressly or impliedly 
assents to the arrangement."46 Likewise, inasmuch as the drawer is dis-
charged upon the holder's failure to duly make presentment, the holder 
cannot be regarded as losing this right solely "as a result of a private 
agreement made between ... banks for their own convenience," unless 
"the very strongest proof of his knowledge and assent" is demonstrated.47 
To that end, while the ordinary usage and practice of banks is relevant 
and decisive as to the sufficiency of any given presentment, such usage 
and practice, "even if proved, could not without more derogate from the 
presenting bank's duty owed to its customer."48 That is, as indicated 
above, both interbank agreement as to a reasonable alternative and the 
agreement of the drawer and payee-holder are required. 
In the facts of Barclays Bank, in connection with the English in-
terbank cheque clearing system, Bingham J. rejected the existence of an 
agreement, or even of an "established usage and practice of bankers 
participating in the clearing ... to treat the delivery of cheques at the 
clearing house as the effective presentment to the paying bank. "49 Rather, 
he found that presentment by the depositary/presenting bank occurs at 
the drawee branch, namely the branch of the drawee bank where the 
account on which each cheque was drawn is kept. Accordingly, he held, 
in transporting each cheque, "the paying bank [is to be regarded] as 
being, from the time of receiving the cheque until the time of presenting 
it [at the branch], a sub-agent of the presenting bank, which is itself the 
agent of the payee."so 
Following Barclays Bank, the English BEA was amended in 1996 
to specifically accommodate the presentment of cheques by a bank, 
either at a data centre or by electronic means.51 As well, the physical 
exhibition requirement has been dispensed with in connection with the 
electronic presentment.52 No corresponding amendment was made in 
46 Ibid., at 391. 
47 Ibid., at 394. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., at 391. 
50 Ibid., at 392. 
51 Sections 74A and 74B of the English Bills of Exchange Act supra, n. 43. These 
provisions were added by SI 1996 No 2993 and are in force as of November 28, 
1996. 
52 Section 74C ibid. 
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' 
Canada, although apparently the electronic presentment of cheques is 
under discussion.53 On their part, as will be further discussed below, 
CPA Clearing Rules appear to accommodate the existence of present-
ment at "the first organizational unit of the Drawee that is able to make 
or act upon a decision to dishonour the [cheque],"54 which is not nec-
essarily the branch of the account and may well be the data centre serving 
it. Yet, as indicated, in the absence of any statutory amendment, as in 
England, to bind customers, customers' agreements must be assumed to 
have occurred. 
In the case at bar, had Advance failed to present the cheque, it must 
have been regarded to be in breach of contract with its customer. Nothing 
to that effect is noted in the judgment, nor does the judgment indicate 
any deviation from normal banking procedures. While it is conceivable 
that banks bypass statutory presentment, it is much less conceivable, in 
light of the analysis above, that banks would agree to abandon a pre-
sentment procedure altogether, thereby exposing themselves to actions 
by their respective customers. To that end, it is regrettable that the Court 
did not address its attention to the existence of an alternative presentment 
procedure and its binding effect on customers. Certainly, the Court was 
right in holding that the mere delivery to TD through the clearing on 
April 9, 2001, was not an effective presentment; this is so, per Barclays 
Bank, due to such delivery being in bulk, without facilitating an informed 
banking decision. Nevertheless, from the report, one may speculate that 
the alternative presentment procedure took place later on during April 
9, 2001, at some point as the cheque was processed in the TD Data 
Centre. The Collingwood branch on which the cheque was purportedly 
drawn did not seem to be involved at all in the decision process. It 
received a copy of the cheque only in response to the protest of its 
customer and only with the view of passing on the cheque to the cus-
tomer.55 Indeed, it is quite plausible to assume that the TD Toronto Data 
Centre was TD's "first organizational unit ... that [was] able to make 
or act upon a decision to dishonour the [cheque]," so as to be the 
53 See CPA, "Cheque Imaging in Canada: A Change Whose Time has Come", January 
6, 2004, online: CPA <http://www.cdnpay.ca/publications/pdfs publications/im-
aging.pdt>. 
54 See e.g., s. 5 to CPA Rule A4 Returned and Redirected Items, governing time 
limitation for return and discussed further under section 4(c) infra. 
55 For the facts and judgment, see respectively, sections 2 and 3 of this a1ticle supra. 
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designated place of presentment. 56 It was of course for TD, at its own 
discretion, to devise a strict or lenient decision making process, or even 
to bypass it at its own risk; yet, having received the cheque, it may not 
then rely on the absence of either a prompt banking decision to pay or 
dishonour the cheque, or even on the lack of an opportunity to make 
such a decision. 
(c) Was the Cheque Paid? 
According to BEA, s. 138(1 ), a cheque, as a specie of a bill of 
exchange, is discharged "by payment in due course."57 Certainly, "pay-
ment" is the most common way for the discharge of a cheque;58 none-
theless, "payment" is not defined in the BEA. Obviously, payment in 
cash over the counter is "payment".59 Payment over the counter is effec-
tively precluded under the BEA where the cheque is crossed.60 In Can-
ada, crossing is not practiced;61 it is nevertheless quite unusual to have 
in Canada a cheque paid by the drawee bank over the counter in cash. 
Similar to the position under the Canadian BEA, in the U.S., the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) speaks of the discharge of an instru-
ment by payment as well as by other means.62 Yet, unlike the BEA, the 
UCC expressly envisages a whole range of payment methods, broadly 
referred to as "settlement". "Settle" is defined in UCC §4-104( 11) as ''to 
pay in cash, by clearing-house settlement, in charge or credit or by 
remittance, or otherwise as agreed." The latter provision further states 
that "settlement may be either provisional or final." "Final payment" is 
then defined in §4-215( a)· in terms of payment in cash, settlement made 
56 Per s. 5 to CPA Rule A4 Returned and Redirected Items supra, n. 54. 
57 Defined in BEA, s. l 38(2) as "payment ... at or after maturity" made in good faith 
"to the holder ... without notice that his title is defective". 
58 For "discharge" by merger, renunciation, and cancellation see BEA, ss. 140-144. 
59 See Chambers v. Miller (1862), 13 C.B. (N.S.) 125, 43 E.R. 50, as well as Hall v. 
Hatch (1901), 3 O.L.R. 147 (Ont. H.C.). 
60 Cheque crossing is governed by BEA, ss. 168-175. For a comparative context, see 
Geva, Bank Collections supra, n. 37 at 136, 155, 174, 185, 430-433, and 485. 
61 Briefly stated, in Canada, in the absence of statutory protections available to paying 
and collecting banks in connection with forged endorsements, "crossing" will result 
in according protections to banks, against the interest of their customers. Geva ibid., 
particularly at 430-435. 
62 Discharge and payment are governed by UCC §§3-601 to 3-604. Discharge by 
payment is dealt with in §3-602. 
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without a right to revoke it, and the failure to revoke a provisional 
settlement "in the time and manner permitted by statute, clearing-house 
rule, or agreement." 
The silence of the BEA as to methods of payment is not to be 
interpreted as excluding payment other than in cash; such interpretation 
is illogical and in fact has no statutory base whatsoever.63 Particularly 
since the practice of collecting and paying cheques through the interbank 
clearing system is anchored in a well-established usage64 and has been 
statutory based,65 the non-cash payment produced thereby is to be taken 
as accorded full recognition as a means of "payment" discharging a 
cheque under BEA, s. 138. 
Indeed, other than in cash, proceeds of a cheque may be paid into 
the holder's bank account, this is the case for any cheque deposited for 
collection by the holder. Yet, the cheque collection process is not a credit 
transfer, in which payment takes place in the payee's bank account,66 
rather it is a debit transfer, in which payment is made in the drawer's 
account and collected into the payee/holder's account.67 Payment of the 
cheque by the drawee bank is thus to be distinguished from the collection 
of the proceeds of its payment by a collecting bank and their deposit to 
the credit of the depositor (payee/holder) of the cheque. It is then in 
connection with the debit posted to the drawer's account by the drawee 
bank that the non-cash payment of a cheque must be taken to occur. 
In the Canadian interbank cheque clearing context, and for the sake 
of simplicity, assuming a Canadian dollar cheque drawn on one direct 
63 After all, even payment in cash itself is not specifically mentioned; even as a matter 
of strict interpretation of the BEA there is no ground to read it as contemplating 
payment in cash to the exclusion of all other methods of payment. 
64 See e.g., Lajambe v. Saint Hilaire (1924), 30 Rev. Leg. (N.S) 447 (Circ. Ct.). 
65 See n. 2 supra. 
66 As for example in The Brimnes TenaxSteamship Co. Ltd. v. The Brimnes (Owners), 
[1973] I All E.R. 769 (QBD (Adm. Ct.)), affd [1974] 3 All E.R. 66 (C.A.). 
67 For the fundamental distinction between credit-"push" into the payee's account, and 
debit-"pull" out of the pay or's account, see Geva, Bank Collections supra, n. 37 at 
127-128. In both banking operations, funds are transferred from the payor's account 
to that of the payee; the difference between the two categories is in the direction of 
the communication flow. In each case, payment occurs in the last bank in the 
communication chain, which is the payor/drawer's bank in a debit transfer (which 
then pulls the funds out of the drawer's account) and the payee/beneficiary's bank 
(which then pushes the funds into the beneficiary's account) in a credit transfer. 
PRESENTMENT & PAYMENT IN ELECTRONIC CLEARING 377 
clearer and deposited in another,68 debit is at all likelihood posted to the 
drawer's account upon the delivery of the cheque to the drawee bank, 
as part of a bulk delivery of all cheques drawn on the drawee bank, by 
the depositary bank in the region of deposit. This debit takes place on 
the basis of information electronically communicated over the internal 
system of the drawee bank, ahead of the arrival of the cheque to "the 
first organizational unit of the Drawee that is able to make or act upon 
a decision to dishonour the [cheque],"69 and hence ahead of any exam-
ination of the cheque and the determination of the availability of cover 
in the drawer's account by the drawee bank. Such a debit is to be treated 
as no less provisional than the credit given by the depositary bank to the 
depositor upon the deposit of the cheque; it is also no less provisional 
than the mutual entries posted to the respective accounts of the drawee 
and depositary banks with the Bank of Canada reflecting the daily 
exchange in which the cheque has been included.70 Accordingly, by no 
means can such a debit to the drawer's account to be considered as the 
payment of the cheque. In the above mentioned terminology of the UCC, 
this is a mere "provisional settlement" that has not crystallized yet to 
"final payment", which is the "payment" with which we are concerned. 
"Payment" out of the drawer's account must then be treated as 
having occurred at some point in the banking process. The task is to 
identify a point of irrevocabi1ity in the position of the drawee bank, in 
terms of either its right against the drawer, or its liability towards the 
presenting bank. Two options are available. The first endeavours to 
identify a point in the internal process of the drawee bank in handling 
the cheque, that is, in what has been often referred to as the process of 
68 In the Canadian interbank cheque clearing system operated by the CPA, direct 
clearers are banks directly participating in the exchange, for themselves and as 
clearing agents for other participating institutions, and settle for resulting balances 
on the books of the Bank of Canada. See n. 2 supra. 
69 Pers. 5 to CPA Rule A4 Returned and Redirected Items supra, n. 54. 
70 On that point, cf statement by Labrosse J. who "[could not] accept the argument 
that the cheque was 'paid' by the debits and credits made through the clearing 
procedure ... any more than when [the bank of deposit] credited the plaintiff on 
deposit of the cheque." See National Slag supra, n. 21 (Ont. H.C.) at 475. On the 
basis of this statement, Spiegel J. treated in Advance the interbank "automatic debit 
and credit" as provisional and not determinative, though as indicated, in the context 
of denying the occurrence of "acceptance" (and not "payment"). See text at n. 22 
supra. National Slag is further discussed in paragraph containing n. 89-91 infra. 
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posting of the cheque to the drawer's account. The second aims at 
identifying a point in the interbank clearing process in which the drawee 
bank has become liable on or accountable for the cheque to the presenting 
bank.71 
At first blush the first option, that focusing on the internal process 
at the drawee bank, looks more attractive. This is so since it also covers 
cheques paid outside the interbank clearing. Such cheques include those 
drawn on the bank of deposit ("on us" cheques), as well as cheques 
drawn on, or deposited with, a correspondent, whether domestic (as for 
example between a direct clearer and an indirect clearer for which the 
direct clearer acts), or cross border. In the context of the first option, the 
examination of the internal process will endeavour to identify a point in 
which the drawee bank either decides to make payment or at least 
demonstrates that an irrevocable decision of payment has been reached. 
Indeed, there is some old case law72 and a legislative precedent in the 
U.S.73 to support it; yet, in the final analysis, this approach is to be 
disfavoured, due to the mechanical or automated nature of the internal 
process. Neither point of decision nor of irrevocability can be identified 
in the normal internal process of posting.74 
71 "Accountability" for the amount of the cheque as part of the process of payment is 
used in this context perhaps to distinguish it from "liability" on the cheque, which 
may be taken to denote responsibility prior to the commencement of the process of 
payment. Yet, as discussed below, "accountability" is still a form of liability to be 
discharged by "final payment"; hence the distinction between "accountability" and 
"liability" is not iron-clad. 
72 See e.g., White v. Royal Bank of Canada (1923), 53 O.L.R. 543, [1923] 4 D.L.R. 
1206 (Ont. C.A.) where it was successfully argued that when the branch of the 
drawee bank on which a cheque was drawn stamped the cheque "paid", and made 
out a credit slip, also stamped "paid", in favour of the branch of deposit (of the same 
bank), payment of the cheque had been made, even in the absence of a debit to the 
drawer's account, and could not have been revoked on notice of the insolvency of 
the drawer. 
73 Under §4-109 of the pre-1990 Official Text of the American Uniform Commercial 
Code, the "process of posting", whose completion, under §4-303(d), marked pay-
ment, was defined to mean "the usual procedure followed by a payor bank in 
determining to pay an item and in recording the payment including one or more of 
the following or other steps as determined by the bank: (a) verification of any 
signature; (b) ascertaining that sufficient funds are available; (c) affixing 'paid' or 
other stamp; (d) entering a charge or entry to a customer's account; (e) correcting or 
reversing an entry or erroneous action with respect to the item." 
74 Hence, in the present (1990) Official Text of Article 4 of the American Uniform 
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The second option attempts to identify the latest point in which the 
drawee bank is allowed to return a cheque dishonoured.75 Having not 
properly exercised the right to return the cheque, the drawee bank must 
then be taken as agreeing to honour it so as to become irrevocably liable. 
In the absence of any specific statutory provision on the point, identifi-
cation could be made by reference to procedures and rules governing 
the interbank clearing process. Indeed, interbank clearing rules are uni-
versal in setting a time limit for the return of a dishonoured cheque. 
Accordingly, a convenient point of reference is that of the loss of the 
right to return a dishonoured cheque, effectively resulting in the revo-
cation of the provisional settlement for it on the day of its delivery to 
the drawee bank. 
In line with the second option, UCC §4-302(a)(l) provides for the 
accountability of the drawee bank upon the failure to timely return or 
send a notice of dishonour for a cheque presented to it.76 The deadline 
for the return or the dispatch of the notice is usually77 the "midnight 
deadline", defined in §4-104(10) as the midnight of the "next banking 
day following the banking day" of the receipt of the cheque. This is a 
general rule, independent of any governing interbank clearing rule or 
agreement. Payment in discharge of this accountability obligation may 
either precede or follow the point of accountability, and is in the form 
of final payment under §4-215, where it is not made in cash, it is carried 
out by either the failure, or lack of legal right, to revoke provisional 
settlement as provided by "statute, clearing-house rule, or agreement."78 
Commercial Code, "the process of posting has been abandoned as inappropriate for 
automated check collection." See Official Comment 4 to present §4-303. See also 
Official Comment 5 to §4-215 highlighting the existence of "[d]ifficulties in deter-
mining when the events described in the former Section 4-109 take place" so as to 
"make the process of posting unsuitable for a system of automated check collection 
or electronic presentment." 
75 Return of the cheque is broadly used here to cover circumstances, if any, under 
which the drawee bank lawfully demonstrates its rejection of payment, e.g., by 
sending an advice, without physically returning the cheque. 
76 For speculating on the use of "accountability" in this context, see n. 71 supra. 
77 The one exception under s. 4-302(a)(l) is the accountability of a drawee bank for an 
interbank cheque retained by it "beyond midnight of the banking day of receipt 
without settling for it". 
78 For "final payment" under s. 4-215 see paragraph containing n. 62 supra. Note that 
under UCC Article 4, events triggering "accountability" under §4-302(1) or consti-
tuting "final payment" under §4-215 are not the only events which under §4-303(a) 
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In the context of interbank clearing, "final payment" will typically occur 
by inaction, that is, by means of the failure to revoke the provisional 
settlement given at the time the cheque was originally given to the 
drawee bank. 
No similar statutory provisions exist in Canada. At the same time, 
under CPA Clearing Rules, whenever payment is refused or cannot be 
obtained, a dishonoured cheque shall be returned by the drawee to the 
bank of deposit "no later than the Business Day following receipt by the 
first organizational unit of the Drawee that is able to make or act upon 
a decision to dishonour the [cheque]."79 With regard to both the obli-
gation to return and its timing, this is similar to the scheme under the 
UCC, except that the aforesaid Canadian Clearing Rules provision is 
not accompanied by a statement as to any result, provided by statute or 
even Clearing Rule, as to the failure to comply with it. The question is 
then if even in the absence of a statutory framework, as under the UCC, 
payment for a cheque that has not been timely returned can be said to 
occur at the expiration of period set out for its return. 
Support for the accountability of the drawee bank and the occur-
rence of payment by it to the presenting bank, in connection with the 
late return of a cheque, can be drawn from two recent Canadian cases 
dealing with disputes between CPA member banks. 
National Bank of Greece (Canada) v. Bank of Montrea/80 (NBG) 
was an appeal by the National Bank of Greece (NBG) from a decision 
by the CPA requiring it to pay the Bank of Montreal (BMO) the face 
value of a cheque returned dishonoured beyond the next-day deadline. 
The cheque was drawn on NBG and deposited by its payee-holder to 
defeat competing notice, stop-payment order, legal process or setoff with respect to 
the cheque; other enumerated events are acceptance or certification of the cheque, 
and a cutoff hour, set at the close of the banking day that immediately follows the 
banking day the bank received the cheque, but which may be fixed to occur earlier, 
though not "earlier than one hour after the opening of [that immediately following] 
... banking day." 
79 Section 5 to CPA Rule A4 Returned and Redirected Items, governing time limitation 
for return, quoted in part in text at n. 54, 56, and 69 supra. Exceptions to both the 
right to return and the time limit are set out in ss. 4 and 6 ibid. 
80 (1999), 1999 CarswellNat 1860, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1694, 175 F.T.R. 232 (Fed. T.D.) 
(Pelletier J.), aff'd (2000), 2000 CarswellNat 3127, [2000] F.C.J. No. 2105, 2000 
CarswellNat 3495, 266 N.R. 361, [2001] 2 F.C. 288, 30 Admin. L.R. (3d) 147, 196 
F.T.R. 320 (note) (Fed. C.A.) (Evans J.A.). 
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the credit of its account with BMO, which used the CPA interbank 
cheque clearing system for delivering the cheque to the Royal Bank of 
Canada (RBC), acting as NBG's clearing agent. RBC duly presented the 
cheque to NBG. In the facts of the case, NBG returned the cheque 
dishonoured to RBC "more than one day after the cheque came to the 
attention of a bank officer having authority to deal with the cheque," 
thereby breaching the aforesaid Rule A4(5). In turn, "for reasons which 
were not made clear, the cheque remained with RBC" for close to a 
month, before RBC returned it to BM0.81 
Effectively then, the sum of the cheque was included in the daily 
Bank of Canada settlement between BMO and RBC, as part of the 
balance of the daily exchange in which the cheque was included. It was 
posted as a credit to BMO and debit to RBC. RBC then charged NBG's 
correspondent account with it. Upon the return of the cheque, its sum 
was included in the daily Bank of Canada settlement between BMO and 
RBC as part of the balance of the daily exchange in which the returned 
cheque was included. It was posted as a debit to BMO and credit to 
RBC; the latter then credited the sum of the returned cheque to the 
account of its correspondent NBG. In turn, BMO then debited the ac-
count of its customer, the payee/holder of the cheque. It then sought to 
recover from NBG the amount so debited to its settlement account with 
the Bank of Canada. 
In its judgment, the Federal Court endorsed the decision of the CPA 
Compliance Panel and upheld the restitution order. While recognizing 
that "the clearing and settlement system is not a proper forum for adju-
dicating disputes which are fundamentally disputes between banks' cus-
tomers," the Court condemned the NBG's "self-serving behavior" and 
stated that "It does [not] [sic] lie in the mouth of a bank to misuse the 
system to avoid a loss, and then to argue that the rules are not intended 
to deprive it of the profit of its non-complying behavior." In the view of 
the ~ourt, a CPA bank member that "gains an unfair advantage by its 
breach of the rules should be required to disgorge that advantage without 
requiring another bank to elect whether it should stand on its strict legal 
rights with its customer or absorb the loss itself."82 
81 Ibid. (TD), paras. 9 and 7. 
82 Ibid. (TD), para. 19. For the Compliance Panel and its order, see reference in 
Goodman supra, n. 4 at 103 n. 14. 
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Indeed, the case did not go as far as explicitly stating that by failing 
to return the cheque by the next-day deadline the drawee bank became 
accountable and thereby, by its failure to revoke its provisional settle-
ment, it must have been taken as having made final payment on the 
cheque. Nevertheless, in allowing BMO to hold on to the proceeds of 
the late returned cheque the Court effectively recognized that the cheque 
had been paid through the interbank settlement upon the failure to make 
a timely return. 
The second case is much more direct on this point. Banque Nation-
ale du Canada v. Caisse centrale Desjardin du Quebec83 (BNC) was an 
action by Banque Nationale du Canada (BNC), the bank of deposit, 
against Caisse, the purported drawee bank, for the amount of a cheque 
that the latter delayed its return beyond the next-day deadline set by the 
above mentioned s. 5 of Clearing Rule A4. In holding for the bank of 
deposit on the basis of the interpretation of the CPA Clearing Rules, the 
Quebec Court of Appeal specifically treated the original settlement, upon 
the delivery of the cheque by the bank of deposit to the drawee bank, as 
provisional and subject to revocation within the procedures established 
by CPA Rules. In the view of the Court, it follows from the language of 
Rule A4, "that a cheque which is not returned within the time limit is 
deemed paid and that the provisional payment made upon the clearing 
of the cheque becomes definitive upon the expiration of the time limit."84 
In Advance, had it been found that TD, the drawee bank, held on 
to the cheque beyond next-day deadline under s. 5 of the abovementioned 
Clearing Rule A4, the unavoidable conclusion, under both NBG and 
BNC, would have been that payment was made. Yet in both cases, 
litigation took place between two CPA member banks. In contrast, Ad-
vance was not a CPA member.85 The impact of this fact is discussed 
immediately below. 
83 2001 CarswellQue 597, [2001] R.J.Q. 846, [2001] R.R.A. 332 (Que. C.A.). 
84 Ibid., at para. 33: "II s'infere de la Regle 4-A qu'un cheque non retoume dans le 
delai est cense paye et que le paiement provisoire !ors du passage du cheque au 
systeme de compensation devient definitive a la expiration du delai." 
85 For the facts of Advance, including its status as a bank not member of the CPA, see 
sections 1 and 2 of this article supra. 
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(d) Was TD Liable?-Advance's Rights and Remedies 
In the United States, under UCC §4-103(b), "clearing-house rules 
... have the effect of agreements ... whether or not specifically assented 
to by all parties interested in [cheques] handled." They are thus binding 
and inure to the benefit of bank customers using the services of banks 
that agreed to such clearing-house rules. However, in the absence of 
such a statutory provision, the Canadian position is quite the opposite: 
"the dealings sanctioned as between the banks by the voluntary associ-
ation in the clearing-house system ... is a matter not binding per se on 
the public .... "86 This position was re-stated in connection to the clearing 
rules promulgated by the CPA. Viewed as an interbank binding contract 
setting standards and conferring rights and obligations on member 
banks, 87 they are to be treated as neither binding nor benefiting non-
members. As was stated in NRG, "It is clear that [CPA] clearing and 
settlement rules and bylaws do not create rights and obligations on the 
part of banks to their customers ... Any rights and remedies created by 
the rules are between banks and the CPA."88 
It was against this background that National Slag v. CJB09 can be 
rationalized. This was an action by a depositor against both the deposi-
tary and drawee banks on the basis ofthe late return of a dishonoured 
cheque by the drawee. Speaking for the Ontario Court of Appeal, 
MacKinnon A.C.J.O. recognized that the drawee bank contravened the 
clearing-house rules, yet he added, "it was not in breach of any duty it 
owed the appellant."90 In Crawford's view, "[t]hat is certainly an easy 
position to defend ... Clearing Rules are internal documents, binding on 
the members of the CPA ... but conferring no benefit and imposing no 
burdens on members of the public."91 
86 Sterling Bankv. Laughlin (1912), 3 O.W.N. 643, 1 D.L.R. 383 (Ont. C.A.). Yet, the 
statement was qualified. See infra, text at n. 105. 
87 See e.g., National Bank of Greece (Canada) v. Canada Permanent Trust Co., [1987) 
R.J.Q. 607 (Que. S.C.). 
88 Supra, n. 80 (TD) at para. 14. 
89 Supra, n. 21 (C.A.), cited with approval in Bank of Nova Scotia v. Regent Enterprises 
(1997), 1997 CarswellNfld 284, 157 Nfld. & P.E.l.R. 102, 486 A.P.R. 102 (Nfld. 
C.A.) at para. 37. 
90 Ibid., at para. 37. 
91 Supra, n. 3 at 16. 
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This position was fully endorsed in Advance;92 while being a bank 
and not an ordinary non-bank customer, Advance was not a CPA mem-
ber. There may be an irony in seeing a bank denied recovery on the basis 
of case law that focused on denial of rights to bank customers. Never-
theless, it is beyond any doubt in relation to the Clearing Rules, as a 
non-member Advance was not entitled to a treatment other than that 
given to all non-members, whether they are banks or non-bank custom-
ers. 
Case law on the point is not uniform in insulating member banks 
from liability other than to fellow members.93 Holding in favour of a 
depositor suing the depositary bank on the basis of the delayed return of 
a cheque, Riedell v. Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd.,94 a leading 
Australian case, concluded that "payment" occurred by the expiration 
of the time prescribed for "returns" under the clearing rules. In thus 
holding that at that point of time, credit given to the depositor upon the 
deposit of the cheque at the depositary bank became final and irrevo-
cable, the Court reasoned as follows: 
The [depositary] bank dealt with the cheque ... in the capacity of agent for the 
[depositor] .... In discharge of its duty to make a prompt presentation of the 
cheque ... the bank was entitled to use the ordinary machinery of the clearing 
... The [depositor] could not complain of any delay involved in the clearing 
house practice ... On the other hand he was entitled as between himself and his 
agent to have the benefit of any advantage arising from the use of the machinery 
of the clearing.95 
One appellate authority in Canada, Stanley Works of Canada Ltd. 
c. Banque Canadienne Nationale,96 reached a similar result, rationalizing 
it on the depositary bank's duty to exercise reasonable diligence for the 
92 Supra, n. 1 at 52-53. 
93 Canada and other BEA jurisdictions are not the only ones to struggle with the issue. 
For a brief review covering France, Germany, Japan and Italy see Geva, Bank 
Collections supra, n. 37 at 178. 
94 [1931] V.L.R. 382 (S.C.). 
95 Ibid., at 384. 
96 (1981), 1981CarswellQue31, (1982] R.L. 433, 20 B.L.R. 282 (Que. C.A.). See also 
Royal Bank of Canada v. Blinn, 1999 CarswellAita 1252, 1999 ABPC 121 (Alta. 
Prov. Ct.), where Stanley Works was regarded (in para. 7) as a legal authority forthe 
argument that the depositary bank "had a duty to enforce a due observance of the 
clearing rules on behalf of its customers". 
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protection of the depositor's interests.97 While the Court did not specif-
ically hold that the cheque had been paid by virtue of the delay in its 
return, it held the bank of deposit accountable to its customer for any 
advantage or benefit derived from the clearing rule, including the benefit 
incurred by the non-timely return of the cheque by the drawee bank.98 
An alternative approach supporting recovery by the depositor 
emerges from Midland Doherty c. Royal Bank of Canada, another case 
that dealt with the late return of dishonored cheques. 99 The Quebec Court 
of Appeal declined to confer on the payee/holder the benefit accorded 
by the clearing rules; it neither held that payment occurred nor held the 
depositary bank liable to the depositor for accepting the returned cheque 
outside the time limit. The Court nevertheless held the drawee bank 
liable to the payee/holder for actual loss suffered on the basis ofreason-
ably supposing that cheques had been paid. In the facts of that case, the 
depositor's actual loss was in the amount of counter payments made to 
the drawer on the assumption that cheques previously issued by the 
drawer to the depositor had been paid. In holding the drawee bank 
directly liable to the depositor, the Court went beyond Riedell and Stan-
ley Works. Yet, damages were limited to actual reliance based loss, which 
were less than the face value of the late returned cheques. 
Among all these conflicting views it is Riedell that strikes as the 
more persuasive and in line with the Canadian position outlined above 
in section 4( c) of this article. While relativity may often be unavoidable, 
I do not feel compelled to conclude that a cheque is to be deemed paid 
between member banks but not between customers. True, customers 
have no standing to sue for the breach of clearing rules to which they 
97 But see National Slag supra, n. 21 at 384 (C.A.) where in similar circumstances the 
Ontario Court of Appeal effectively regarded the duty to be contracted out. 
98 Stanley Works supra, n. 96 provoked an exchange of opinions in the Bar Review. 
The judgment was supported by J. Choquette (1982), 60 Can. Bar Rev. 746 and 
criticized by B. Crawford (1983), 61 Can. Bar Rev. 921, who inter alia challenged 
the accuracy of the text of the specific clearing rule relied on by the Court (which in 
the pre CPA era was not a public document and had to be produced as a piece of 
evidence). 
99 [1984] C.S. 909 (Que. S.C.), partly rev'd [1990] AQ No. IO (CAQ). In the facts of 
the case returned USD denominated cheques were mistakenly directed within the 
drawee bank from the branch to the data centre rather than to the international 
department; this resulted in a significant delay in their actual return to the depositary 
bank (and hence to the depositor). 
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are not parties, yet, it does not follow that they cannot benefit from 
"payment" that occurred under them; this is simply an unwarranted 
derivation. Indeed, taken at face value, National Slag is to be read as 
conferring on the drawee bank, acting with the consent of the presenting 
bank, an open-ended right to return a cheque at any time so that the 
depositor can never know whether it has been paid. 100 This conclusion 
is untenable; it would have eliminated any certainty as to the discharge 
of obligations paid by cheque. Not surprisingly, on occasion, courts have 
sought to avoid it. Thus in Toronto Dominion Bank v. Reeser, the drawee 
bank sought to return through the clearing a series of cheques, presented 
to the drawee bank between 7 and 20 months earlier. The Court declined 
to follow National Slag, rather, it held that pertinent cheques "were 
honoured on presentment" and thus cannot be returned. 101 
Indeed, certainty of payment is a fundamental objective of any non-
cash payment system. 102 True, no compelling regulatory concerns may 
require the achievement of such certainty in the cheque collection sys-
tem; 103 yet, certainty of payment is extremely important to the parties to 
the cheque transaction. Typically, it is only when the cheque is paid that 
the debt for which it was given is discharged. 104 And while it is inherent 
in the cheque collection machinery that no advance guarantee may be 
given as to the exact time of payment, in retrospect there must be a point 
of time in which a cheque ought to be treated as "paid", and hence the 
debt paid by it is absolutely discharged. In short, having presented a 
100 Quarre whether a cheque is to be taken as "paid" on its return to the drawer, or the 
inclusion of its amount in a bank statement. Nevertheless, not all cheques are 
returned to the drawer and periodic statements may be submitted under qualifica-
tions and reservations so as not to be regarded as account stated. Also, all these are 
facts that may not be known to the depositor and may take place long after the 
clearing of the cheque and its "final payment" between the banks; it is thus both 
unfair and impractical to have the occurrence of "payment" dependent on them. 
101 No 238131/85, Ont. Dist. Ct. Civ. Div. (November4, 1987). 
102 Where payment is made in cash, the physical delivery of the money marks the 
conclusion of payment and the discharge of the debt so paid. It is thus necessary in 
a non-cash payment to find a functional equivalent. Cf. discussion, though in con-
nection with a credit transfer to a bank account, by Brandon J. in The Brimne supra, 
n. 66 (QBD, Adm. Ct). 
103 See CPSS, Core Principles of Systematically Important Payment Systems (Basie: 
BIS, January 200 I) at 70-75. 
104 This is so since payment by cheque is presumed to be conditional. See Charge Card 
Services Ltd., Re (1988), [ 1989) Ch. 497, [ 1988} 3 All E.R. 702 (Eng. C.A.). 
PRESENTMENT & PAYMENT IN ELECTRONIC CLEARING 387 
cheque for payment through the interbank clearing system, a holder is 
likely to be cognizant of the fact that no confirmation as to payment will 
ever be given so that in effect, "no news is good news". Yet there ought 
to be a point of time in which the holder is entitled to suppose the 
occurrence of payment, or at least be able to verify it. The position under 
which the holder's bank is protected from a late return of the cheque but 
not the holder is untenable. 
Two principal reasons will be mentioned as to why, as a matter of 
strict legal analysis, lack of entitlement by customers to the benefit of 
"payment" is an unwarranted derivation from their lack of privity under 
clearing rules. First, even Sterling Bank v. Laughlin itself, the locus 
classicus for the lack of standing of customers to sue and be sued on the 
basis of clearing rules, did not rule out the incorporation of such rules 
into banking contracts on the basis of usage. It effectively held that "the 
dealings sanctioned as between the banks by the voluntary association 
in the clearing-house system ... is a matter not binding per se on the 
public unless it can be assumed or proved that the party sought to be 
charged has been dealing with the bank subject to the usage of the 
clearing house."105 Arguably, Riedell106 made the required assumption 
whose effect is to provide the link allowing the bank customer to benefit 
from the rules inuring to the benefit of his or her agent. 107 
Second, I agree that deeming interbank payment to occur does not 
justify a direct cause of action of the depositor against the drawee bank. 
Crawford is absolutely right in pointing out that BEA, s. 126 precludes 
an action by the holder against a drawee of an unaccepted bill of 
exchange, including a cheque. 108 True, to distinguish liability to make 
payment - barred under the aforesaid s. 126, from accountability or 
liability incurred in the process of payment that has allegedly been made, 
is not entirely impossible. 109 Yet this is too fine a distinction, and quite 
a tenuous basis for allowing direct recovery by the depositor from the 
drawee bank. Indeed, other than Midland Doherty, leading cases did not 
10s Supra, n. 86 (emphasis added). 
106 Supra, n. 94. 
107 See quotation in text at n. 95 supra. 
108 Supra, n. 3 at 5-7. In its relevant part, the provision flatly states that "the drawee of 
a bill who does not accept as required by this Act is not liable on the instrument." 
In Advance no acceptance took place. See supra, section 4(a) of this article. 
109 Cf. n. 71 supra. 
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allow the depositor to recover from the drawee bank. 110 Thus, in the final 
analysis, in dismissing Advance's action against TD, the drawee bank, 
Advance was correctly decided. 
At the same time, the foregoing analysis does not preclude recovery 
by the depositor from the depositary bank. In the interbank cheque 
collection system, the drawee bank pays the presenting bank, where the 
latter is the depositary bank it acts as the agent for the depositor, other-
wise it acts as a subagent. Either way, the depositor may recover only 
from the depositary bank, the depositor's own agent, who is also re-
sponsible to the depositor for acts or omissions of any other collecting 
bank, including the presenting bank, acting in the collection as a suba-
gent. 111 In any event, recovery by the depositor from the depositary bank 
is simply on the basis ofreceipt of payment, whether directly, or through 
a subagent, rather than on the breach of contract or tort duty .112 
5. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: THE OVERALL 
FRAMEWORK 
By itself, deeming payment to occur on the basis of the failure to 
meet the time limits for the return of a dishonoured cheque as set out by 
clearing rules is not an all-inclusive principle of law, covering all situ-
ations. It does not cover "on-us" cheques, 113 interbank cheques dealt 
1 ID This applies to Riedell supra, n. 94, Stanley Works supra, n. 96, and Reeser supra, 
n. 10 l, all of which allowed recovery from the depositary but not the drawee bank. 
111 Forthe chain of liability in agency under the common law see e.g., R. Powell, The 
Law of Agency, 2nd ed. (London: Pitman, 1961) at 309. For the classic common 
law position with regard to the legal nature of the payment order and the resulting 
chain of liability see Royal Products v. Midland Bank [1981] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 194, 
198 (Q.B.) (Webster J.). The case was concerned with a payment order initiating a 
credit transfer; yet the pertaining analysis equally applies to instructions initiating 
cheque collection such as those given by the depositor, 
112 In the case of more than one collecting bank, that is, where the presenting bank is 
other than the depositary bank, whether recovery by the depositor from the depos-
itary bank is as early as of receipt of payment by the presenting bank, or only as of 
receipt of payment by the depositary bank, will not be dealt with in this article. In 
the United States, under UCC §4-215(d), "If a collecting bank receives a settlement 
for [a cheque] which is or becomes final, the bank is accountable to its customer 
for the amount of the [cheque] and any provisional credit given forthe [cheque] in 
an account with its customer becomes final." This seems to point out at the entitle-
ment of the depositor to recover from the depositary bank only as arising on receipt 
of payment by the depositary bank itself. 
113 As was the case in Process Piping Specialties c. Banque Canadienne lmperiale de 
PRESENTMENT & PAYMENT IN ELECTRONIC CLEARING 389 
with outside the regular interbank clearing system,114 and possibly, de-
pending on the actual language of applicable clearing rules, even the 
return of a dishonoured cheque outside the system. 115 There is however 
a broader framework into which all such cases fall. 
At the crux of the matter is the centrality of the presentment re-
quirement and the definitiveness of the response required from the 
drawee bank, by either honouring or dishonouring the cheque; there is 
no midway between these two options, that of payment and refusal to 
pay. Indeed, payment in cash is not mandated. In deference to commer-
cial usage and practice, recognition is to be given to non-cash payment 
occurring in the course of the interbank cheque clearing and settlement. 
It is however in this context that an obligation to pay and actual payment 
are to be identified. 
Notwithstanding MacKinnon A.C.J.O.'s statement in National 
Slag, the point is not that "one day's delay" in the return of the cheque 
cannot "turn a worthless cheque, by some legal legerdemain, into a good 
one."116 Rather, by not returning the "worthless cheque," in a timely 
manner, the drawee bank has manifested its intention to pay it, thereby 
turning it into "a good one." The situation becomes a usual case in which 
"a customer [drew] a cheque on the bank without funds in his account 
or agreed overdraft facilities sufficient to meet it"; on presentation, the 
cheque "constitutes a request to the bank to provide overdraft facilities 
... ", with respect to which "[t]he bank has an option whether or not to 
comply ... " In paying the cheque, the bank accepts the request and acts 
within its mandate; it become entitled to debit its customer's account, 
but may not recover from the recipient even when the payment was 
mistakenly made. 117 
Determining the point of time in which "payment" is made in the 
course of cheque clearing is not a matter of, strictly speaking, the inter-
pretation of the clearing rules. Rather it is by reference to commercial 
Commerce, 1986 CarswellQue 1161, [1986] R.J.Q. 2429 (Que. S.C.) that nonethe-
less purported to follow Stanley Works supra, n. 96. 
114 As for example for a cross-border bank, presenting a cheque for collection outside 
the CPA operated cheque clearing system in Canada. 
115 For this point, see Crawford supra, n. 3 at 14-15. 
116 Supra, n. 21 (C.A.) at 383 
117 Barclays Bank v. W.J. Simms supra, n. 31 at 238. 
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usage and practice, which may be evidenced by the clearing rule but 
need not be strictly governed by them. Even in the absence of a definite 
applicable clearing rule, either because it is not comprehensive or badly 
drafted, or whenever the clearing rule does not apply, as in the case of 
an "on us" cheque or a cross-border bank, a court is to determine the 
time the drawee bank assumed responsibility. In short, commercial usage 
and practice may be good enough to bypass cash payment but not to 
override the fundamental requirements of presentment and definite re-
sponse to it. To that end, an applicable well written clearing rule is 
helpful and conducive to certainty, yet, in principle, it is not an absolute 
necessity. Where such a rule does not apply, a court will nevertheless 
have to decide as to the time of an "on us" cheque, 118 as well as on the 
effect of a delay caused by either an intermediary bank, 119 or a drawee 
bank that delayed the return of the cheque in holding on to it prior to its 
arrival to the organizational unit with the decision making power. 120 
Indeed, "payment" will not easily be deduced from a clearing rule 
under all circumstances; to that end, a detailed statutory scheme, as 
under the UCC, providing for "accountability" and "final payment" by 
reference to specified statutory time limits, 121 is helpful. Yet, even in the 
absence of such a scheme, so far as the Canadian interbank cheque 
clearing system is concerned, a similar result can be reached as a matter 
of statutory interpretation of the BEA in conjunction with general prin-
ciples of law. 
In the absence of "payment" generated by a delayed return, the 
depositary bank, as a collecting agent for the depositor, is responsible 
to the depositor for the negligence of every intermediary bank and that 
of the drawee bank, each of which acts in the collection process as the 
subagent of the depositary bank. 122 Indeed, under the common law, direct 
118 As in Process Piping supra, n. 113. 
119 In fact, in NBG supra, n. 80, the major part of the delay in the return of the cheque 
was not attributed to the extra day it was retained with the drawee bank, but rather 
to the fact that "for reasons which were not made clear, the cheque remained with 
RBC" for close to a month, before it returned it to BMO. See supra, text at n. 81. 
120 Which would be the reverse of Midland Doherty supra, n. 99, where the delay 
occurred between the deciding organizational unit and the depositary bank. 
121 See supra, discussion in paragraphs containing n. 76-78 and 62. 
122 For the agency status of a collecting bank see e.g., Crawford supra, n. 2 vol. I at 
134 and 261. For the position of the drawee bank as an agent or sub-agent for the 
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liability of the drawee bank to the depositor, as was held under civil law 
in Midland Doherty, does not rest on firm ground. 123 However, to a 
depositor who suffered loss on the basis of the late return of a cheque, 
the depositary bank may be liable for damages; this however is a less 
promising alternative or avenue of recovery than on the basis of a debt 
owed on receipt of "payment", to be resorted only where no determi-
nation of"payment" has been made. As in Midland Doherty, in an action 
for damages rather than on a debt, actual loss to be recovered may not 
be to the full face value of the cheque. 124 
In the final analysis, Advance was correct in disallowing the action 
against TD. Yet, TD "paid" the cheque. Under Canadian law, 125 Advance 
ought to have pursued its remedies from its collecting agent, American 
National Bank of Chicago. 
depositary bank see Barclays Bank v. Bank of England supra, n. 41, which specif-
ically held that in passing on the cheque from the point of its delivery to it until 
actual presentment (at the branch), the drawee bank is acting as an agent for the 
presenting bank. Thus under the common Jaw, the depositary bank in Midland 
Doherty supra, n. 99, would have held liable to the depositor for the negligence of 
the drawee bank; contrary to what was held under civil law, there would not be 
direct liability of the drawee to the depositor. 
123 On this point I am in agreement with Crawford supra, n. 3 at 16-19. Yet, it is to be 
noted that under the common law, the tort liability of a subagent to the principal is 
not all that impossible. See Powell supra, n. 111 at 309. 
124 See paragraph containing n. 99 supra. As well, for recovery of damages, both duty 
and its breach are to be established and proved. 
125 This appears to be the result also under the UCC. See text at n. 112 supra. Conflicts 
of laws issues are outside the scope of this article. 
